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An axiomatic construction for lifecycle preferences accounting for the
￿niteness and the randomness of life duration is provided. We emphasize
the role of intertemporal correlation aversion and explain why multiplica-
tive preferences provide an interesting alternative to additive preferences,
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are discussed.
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11 Introduction
Looking at the economic literature one may distinguish two main categories of
theoretical works on intertemporal preferences: those that consider an in￿nite
horizon and those that consider a ￿nite horizon. In between the two, however,
lies an intermediate setting, which has barely been studied to date: the case of
an in￿nite possibility of ￿nite horizons. This corresponds to the case of agents
who care for ￿ ows of payments, which will stop after some ￿nite time, but whose
stopping time is random or a matter of choice.
The most obvious case where such a setting is relevant is life cycle planning.
Human beings are indeed sure to die within a ￿nite time, but do not know when
they will die. They have therefore to consider an in￿nite possibility of ￿nite
horizons. A number of other problems, however, such as ￿rm behavior, dynasty
behavior, political modeling, could also ￿t into this domain.
The economic literature has not paid special attention to this setting because
it is perceived as a particular instance of the in￿nite horizon case. The standard
argument is that a ￿nite payment ￿ ow can always be seen as an in￿nite payment
￿ ow where payments equal zero after some ￿nite time. Thus, assuming an in￿nite
horizon would provide a general framework allowing to account for cases where
payments have to be null after some ￿nite amount of time. However, the economic
literature, in particular that on social choice, abounds with examples where it is
found that working on too large a domain may well lead to too restrictive results.
The present paper provides an illustration of this general principle in the domain
of intertemporal choice. We will indeed emphasize that considering the set of
￿nite payment ￿ ows, rather than the larger set of in￿nite payment ￿ ows, makes
it possible to derive new preference representations, with potentially important
implications.
Our contribution is threefold. First, we will suggest an axiomatic construction
of preferences based on very simple axioms: rationality, continuity, independence
(in the sense introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern) and stationarity.
This will provide the foundations for widely used models (as with Yaari￿ s model
of intertemporal choice under uncertain lifetime) as well as suggest new speci-
2￿cations for life-cycle preferences. In particular, we will underline the case of
multiplicative preferences which provide a way to disentangle intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution and risk aversion, without abandoning the expected utility
framework or the assumption of preference stationarity.
Second we discuss fundamental properties of stationary life-cycle preferences
and discuss how they relate to what can be observed from choices of agents having
an uncertain lifetime. We will in particular provide a formal decomposition of
the rate of time discounting, explaining how pure time preferences, mortality and
risk aversion contribute to human impatience.
Last, as an illustration we will apply our framework to life cycle consumption
planning. The standard result, obtained when considering additive preferences
and perfect credit markets, is that people with stationary preferences should opt
for a consumption pro￿le which has a constant growth rate (see Yaari, 1965).
However, this prediction was contradicted by empirical observations, where it
is found that the life cycle consumption pro￿le is hump shaped. Allowing for
temporal risk aversion, we ￿nd that Yaari￿ s predictions do not extend to non-
additive preferences. The increase of mortality rates at old age together with
a positive intertemporal correlation aversion may generate non-monotonic con-
sumption pro￿les - even when focusing on stationary preferences and considering
perfect markets.
The paper is organized as follow. Section 2 discusses the related literature.
Section 3 details the setting, making clear what is meant by an in￿nite possibility
of ￿nite horizons. Sections 4 and 5 provide an axiomatic construction of prefer-
ences. Properties of stationary preferences are then discussed in Sections 6 and
7. Section 8 is about time discounting when agents￿horizons are random. Sec-
tion 9 looks at the problem of consumption smoothing when considering realistic
mortality data. Section 10 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The axiomatic construction of preferences developed in the current paper relies
on an assumption of stationarity of preferences. Such an assumption was ￿rst
3introduced by Koopmans (1960) in a deterministic setting. It was extended by
Epstein (1983) to the case of choice under uncertainty within the expected utility
framework, and by Epstein and Zin (1989) to non-expected utility models. As
our work ￿ts into the expected utility framework, our formulation of preference
stationarity will be exactly the same as the one proposed by Epstein (1983). We
will also make use of the same recursivity arguments to provide an explicit repre-
sentation of preferences. The originality lies therefore neither in the stationarity
assumption nor in the techniques used, but on the fact that we consider a do-
main that is smaller than usual. As we will see, this explains why even if our
results look similar to those of Epstein (1983) in some respects, they also di⁄er
in suggesting models that could not be obtained when considering in￿nite hori-
zons. Even if the idea of constraining consumption to be in a given state after a
￿nite amount of time has been used in several instances (starting from Ramsey,
1928, could we say1), we are not aware of other papers providing an axiomatic
construction of preferences on the domain we consider.
One of the ￿ndings of the paper is that stationary preferences can have a
multiplicative representation, making it possible to study the role of risk aver-
sion, keeping intertemporal substitutability constant. As a consequence, our work
relates to the literature devoted to studying the role of risk aversion in intertem-
poral frameworks, and in particular to Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974) and Epstein
and Zin (1989). The relevance of these di⁄erent approaches is now discussed in
Bommier, Chassagnon, Le Grand (2010), who propose an abstract de￿nition of
what it means ￿to be more risk averse than someone else￿ and examines which
classes of utility functions are well ordered in terms of risk aversion.
Since the preferences we derive are not necessarily time additive, we will often
refer to the literature on multi-attribute utility theory. For example, the notion of
￿intertemporal correlation aversion￿(ICA, hereafter), which is explained in Sec-
tion 6, was discussed -under di⁄erent names- in Keeney and Rai⁄a (1976), Richard
(1975), Epstein and Tanny (1980), Dor￿ eitener and Krapp (2007) or Tsetlin and
1Ramsey￿ s assumption is slighty di⁄erent as he considers the case where utility has to reach
a given level -called Bliss- in a ￿nite amout of time or "at least approximate to it inde￿nitely"
(Ramsey, 1928 p.545).
4Winkler (2009). Bommier (2007) showed how ICA, risk aversion and intertempo-
ral elasticity of substitution are related. Eeckhoudt, Rey and Schlessinger (2007)
explained how ICA could be identi￿ed through simple experiments. Recently,
Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rustr￿m (2011) provide experimental results mea-
suring ICA.
Allowing for ICA generates a signi￿cant shift in life cycle modeling, in partic-
ular when accounting for lifetime uncertainty. Bommier (2006) ￿rst highlighted
that the combination of ICA (or risk aversion with respect to life duration) and
mortality risk generates time discounting, in a paper which focused on weakly
separable preferences. Formal results on the rate of time discounting were de-
rived, but only in the limit case where the value of life tends towards in￿nity, so
that additivity of the expected utility function could be recovered. One of the
results of the present paper also bears on time discounting under lifetime uncer-
tainty. Departing from the focus of Bommier (2006), it applies to the whole set
of stationary preferences (including those which are not weakly separable) and is
independent of any asymptotic approximation. We will indeed provide a general
decomposition of the rate of time discounting into elements that arise from pure
time preference, mortality and risk aversion.
As ICA generates a strong link between mortality risks and impatience, opting
for models with non-zero ICA provides new insights on a number of topics, such
as the impact of mortality decline, the value of life or lifecycle portfolio choice.
These points are discussed in other papers: Bommier (2008), for the impact of
mortality decline, Bommier and Villeneuve (2010) for the value of life, Bommier
and Rochet (2006) and Bommier (2010) for issues related to portfolio choice.2
Giving up additive separability may also lead to new policy recommendations
when there is asymmetric information. Such a point is addressed in Bommier,
Leroux and Lozachmeur (2010), who consider the design of pension systems when
agents have private information on their mortality.
There are actually many other applications that could be developed to illus-
trate the role of ICA. We shall only mention one of them in the current paper:
2Bommier and Rochet (2006) ignore lifetime uncertainty. Bommier (2010) introduces ran-
dom mortality, but focuses on weakly separable preferences.
5the possibility of providing an explanation for the hump shape of life cycle con-
sumption pro￿les. In that perspective, the paper relates to the empirical liter-
ature that estimates the shape of consumption pro￿les, as with Gourinchas and
Parker (2002) or FernÆndez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007). It also connects with
those who suggested explanations for this hump shape (see for example Attana-
sio, Banks, Meghir and Weber, 1999), and more particularly those who wondered
whether mortality could be at the origin of this shape, such as B￿tler (2001),
Hansen and Imrohoroglu (2008) or Feigenbaum (2008).
To end this Section we shall emphasize that this paper ￿ts into the litera-
ture on intertemporal choice under uncertainty, which has developed over several
decades, providing numerous contributions that cannot be extensively reviewed
here. The way our paper innovates in this domain is rather atypical, in the
sense that we do not extend an existing framework. Many previous develop-
ments involved looking at what happens when relaxing some assumption. The
literature on hyperbolic discounting on habit formation, or on rank dependent
expected utility, are examples illustrating what can be achieved by relaxing some
"classical" assumptions. Rather than following the same line, the current paper
focuses on strong and standard assumptions, but innovates by de￿ning prefer-
ences on a smaller domain. This is de￿nitely not to mean that these classical
assumptions should not be weakened in future works. On the contrary, it would
be extremely interesting to consider non-stationary preferences or non-expected
utility approaches. But, instead of focusing on extensions of the additive model,
as has been done so far, one could also build upon the models that are suggested
in the paper, and in particular upon the multiplicative model. In other words,
while emphasizing that there are some interesting speci￿cations which were not
developed, though compatible with the most standard assumptions, the paper
does not want to argue that departures from the "classical" assumptions should
be disregarded. Instead, it aims at providing a di⁄erent basis, upon which exten-
sions could be developed.
63 Setting
Time is assumed to be discrete. We are interested in the problems of agents
who care for a ￿ ow of consumption (or payments) but who know that, for some
reason, this ￿ ow will have to stop after a ￿nite amount of time. Speaking of life
and death is probably the easiest way to illustrate our setting, but it is clear that
our work does not exclusively apply to the modelling of human beings. It could
also apply to ￿rms, dynasties, political parties or other sort of agents.
An agent will be considered to be "alive" when consuming a positive amount
and "dead" when the consumption ￿ ow has come to its end.
Formally, consumption is assumed to take values in R￿
+ and there is a death
state denoted by the letter d : Thus, at any moment in time, the state of an




Technically speaking, we could confuse being dead and having zero consumption.
This could however be misleading. We would indeed end up working with a
connected, convex and ordered set X and tempted to impose standard assump-
tions of continuity, convexity or monotonicity of preferences. However, in many
cases these assumptions could not relate to any sensible or plausible statement.
Think of human life for example: it makes no sense to think of a state where the
agent is half dead and half alive. A lottery that gives one unit of consumption
(x = 1) or being dead (x = d) with equal probabilities does not need to have
a certainty equivalent. This seems clear when considering that death is not like
any consumption level, while it could look counter-intuitive if we had arti￿cially
set d = 0. Similarly, with our approach, there may exist a consumption level
c￿ > 0 providing the same utility as death. The existence of such a consumption
level, and its value, are determined by the agent￿ s preferences and not imposed by
construction. Had we arti￿cially set d = 0; we would ￿nd that an agent could be
indi⁄erent between consuming c￿ > 0 and "consuming" 0, which could seem odd,
if one forgets that "zero consumption" actually means being dead - something
7di⁄erent from being alive and consuming nothing.
Considering (zi)i2N 2 XN an in￿nite sequence of elements of X, we shall say
that (zi)i2N is a "life" (or a "feasible ￿ ow of payments") whenever it ful￿lls the
two following properties:
Property 1: (Life ￿niteness) There exist j 2 N such that zj = d:
Property 2: (Death Irreversibility) If zj = d for some j 2 N, then zk = d for
all k ￿ j.
We will denote by Z the set of lives, that is the set of elements of XN which ful-
￿ll the above two properties. Note that with this de￿nition the sequence (d;d;:::)
is considered as a life. An important feature of this set Z is that it is stationary
in the sense that
(z0;z1;z2;::::) 2 Z =) (z1;z2;::::) 2 Z
This property is essential as it will enable the notion of preference stationarity
to be de￿ned (Axiom 4, introduced later on).
We denote by L(Z) the set of simple lotteries (i.e: lotteries with a ￿nite
number of possible outcomes) with outcomes in Z: This set of lotteries is endowed
with a mixture operation ￿; de￿ned as usual.
Moreover, for any l 2 L(Z) and any c0 in R￿
+ we de￿ne
c0 ￿ l 2 Z
as the lottery that involves consuming c0 for sure in the ￿rst period and then
living (and dying) according to the lottery l; delayed by one period. For example,
if l is the lottery that gives (x0;x1;x2:::) or (y0;y1;y2:::) with equal probability,
then c0￿l is the lottery that gives (c0;x0;x1;x2:::) and (c0;y0;y1;y2:::) with equal
probability.
4 Assumptions
We now state the axioms that will lead to our representation result.
8Axiom 1 (Ordering) Individuals have a rational preference relation (i.e. a com-
plete preorder) on L(Z).
We denote by ￿ the preference relation, ￿ the strict preference relation, and
￿ the indi⁄erence relation.
Axiom 2 (Independence) For any l1;l2, l3 2 L(Z) and any ￿ 2 (0;1)
l1 ￿ l2 , ￿l1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)l3 ￿ ￿l2 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)l3
Axiom 3 (Continuity) For any l1; l2; l3 2 L(Z) such that
l1 ￿ l2 ￿ l3
there exists ￿ 2 (0;1) such that
l2 ￿ ￿l1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)l3
Axioms 1 to 3 are the usual axioms of expected utility theory. As such,
they could be open to of discussion. A number of empirical and experimental
papers have stressed that the independence axiom is probably too strong. Several
theoretical frameworks have been suggested relaxing the independence axiom, as
with rank dependent expected utility theory. It would of course be interesting to
develop extensions of the current paper applying these approaches, but that is a
matter for the future.
The last axiom expresses the assumption of stationarity.
Axiom 4 (Stationarity) For any c0 2 R￿
+ and any l;l0 2 L(Z) we have:
l ￿ l
0 , (c0 ￿ l) ￿ (c0 ￿ l
0)
In a dynamic setting, the assumption of stationarity would imply that pref-
erences are history independent and time consistent. Therefore, two individuals
of di⁄erent ages, say a 30 year old and 60 year old, would have the same pref-
erences regarding their futures. That does not imply that they would behave in
9the same way. They would do so only if they faced the same constraints: that is
the same budget constraints and the same mortality risks. In practice mortality
strongly depends on age, and a 30 year old and a 60 year old are confronted with
radically di⁄erent constraints. Consequently, we expect them to behave very dif-
ferently, even if they have the same preferences. Stated otherwise, stationarity
involves assuming that age is a relevant variable only because it a⁄ects individual
constraints (in particular those related to mortality). Such an assumption can
of course be criticized. The literature on habit formation emphasizes that past
consumption may impact preferences regarding the future. Departing from the
stationarity assumption to introduce history dependence would surely be another
interesting extension to develop. The present paper, which focus on stationary
preferences, should thus be seen as a starting point providing economic insights on
how individual behavior may change along the life cycle as a direct consequence
of decreasing life expectancy, independent of any changes in taste.
An important feature of our axiomatic formulation is that it applies to the set
of atemporal lotteries and uses the axioms introduced by von Neumann and Mor-
genstern. Therefore, we remain within the realm of expected utility theory and
do not follow the direction initiated by Kreps and Porteus (1978) who extended
the von Neumann-Morgenstern framework to temporal lotteries in order to obtain
more general models of dynamic choice. Corollary 3 of Kreps and Porteus (1978)
tells us that our framework can be considered as a particular case of Kreps and
Porteus￿ s dynamic choice theory where individuals are indi⁄erent to the timing
of resolution of uncertainty. Whether or not such an assumption of indi⁄erence
should be relaxed is open to debate. Dynamic choice theory indisputably o⁄ers a
greater ￿ exibility. But it is also much more complex than expected utility theory.
In fact, most papers that use dynamic choice theory respond to this increase in
complexity by assuming particular speci￿cations. Instead, we prefer to remain in
the simpler framework provided by the expected utility theory but consider all
the speci￿cations that are consistent with the stationarity axiom.
105 The set of stationary preferences
As is known from Fishburn (1970), Axioms 1 to 3 imply that preferences on L(Z)
have an expected utility representation, which means that there exists a function
U : Z ! R
such that
l1 ￿ l2 , El1 [U] ￿ El2 [U]
where El1 [:] and El1 [:] denote the expectation operator associated with the lot-
teries l1 and l2. In the following we will call U a utility index. Our ￿rst result
provides the structure that this utility index must have for preferences to be
stationary :
Proposition 1 Preferences ful￿ll Axioms 1 to 4 if and only if they can be rep-







v(zj)) for all z = (zi)i2N 2 Z (1)
where u and v are two functions from X into R; with u(d) = 0.3
Proof. 1. Su¢ ciency







v(zi)). For any c0 2 R+, and any l 2 L(Z) we
have:
Ec0￿l [U] = u(c0) + exp(￿v(c0))El [U]
and therefore, for any l, l0 and c0
l ￿ l
0 , El [U] ￿ El0 [U] , Ec0￿l [U] ￿ Ec0￿l0 [U] , c0 ￿ l ￿ c0 ￿ l
0
3When i = 0; the second sum in equation (1) reads as
￿1 P
j=0
; which, by convention, should
be considered as being equal to zero. Such a convention will be used throughout the paper.




11Preferences are thus stationary.
2. Necessity
Axioms 1 to 3 imply that preferences admit an expected utility representation
(Fishburn 1970). Let us denote by U a utility index associated with such a
representation. As adding a constant to U does not impact preferences, it can be
assumed without loss of generality that U(d;d;:::) = 0: Let us now show that U
may be expressed as in (1) for some functions u and v.
For any c0 2 R+ and any l;l0 2 L(Z), we know from Axiom 4 that:
l ￿ l
0 , (c0 ￿ l) ￿ (c0 ￿ l
0)
With the expected utility representation:
(c0 ￿ l) ￿ (c0 ￿ l
0) , Ec0￿l [U] ￿ Ec0￿l0 [U]
For a given c0 de￿ne:
V : Z ! R
z = (zi)i2N ) V (z) = U(c0;z0;z1;:::)
For any l 2 L(Z) we have Ec0￿l [U] = El [V ]. Thus:
l ￿ l
0 , El [V ] ￿ El0 [V ]
which means that V is another utility index representing the preference relation.
Since, in the expected utility representation, two utility indices represent the
same preferences if and only if they are related by a positive a¢ ne transformation,
there must exist u(c0) 2 R and !(c0) > 0, such that, for all (zi)i2N 2 Z:
V (z0;z1;:::) = u(c0) + !(c0)U(z0;z1;:::)
12By de￿nition of the function V , we thus have:
U(c0;z0;z1;:::) = u(c0) + !(c0)U(z0;z1;:::)
Since !(c0) > 0 we can de￿ne v(c0) = ￿log(!(c0)), to obtain:
U(c0;z0;z1;:::) = u(c0) + exp(￿v(c0))U(z0;z1;:::) (2)
Now, because of life ￿niteness and death irreversibility, any element of Z
di⁄erent from (d;d;:::) is of the form (c0;c1;:::;cn;d;d;d;:::) for some n 2 N and
some ci 2 R￿
+. Iterating (2) n times, we obtain:




























Extending the function u, which was de￿ned on R￿
+, to X by posing u(d) = 0 we








which proves the Proposition.
Before discussing this representation result and explaining how it relates to
past contributions, let us give formal names to two particular cases that will be
of special importance throughout the paper.
De￿nition 1 Preferences will be called ￿additive￿if they can be represented with
a utility index of the form (1) with a constant function v. In such a case, setting






De￿nition 2 Preferences will be said to be ￿multiplicative￿if they can be repre-
sented with a utility index of the form (1) with functions u and v such that v =
￿kw(c) and u(c) = 1￿e￿kw(c)
k for some constant k and some function w : X ! R















w(zi) if k = 0
(4)
Now, let us discuss the interest of Proposition 1 and the novelty of our ap-
proach. A representation result that looks very similar was provided by Epstein
(1983). The similarity between Epstein￿ s representation and ours is not surprising
since both Epstein (1983) and the current paper deal with stationary expected
utility preferences. The assumption of preference stationarity imposes a recursive
structure to the utility index, as shown in equation (2), which leads to the gen-
eral expression given in Proposition 1.4 The di⁄erence with the representation of
Epstein (1983), however, is that we do not have constraints on the function u and
v; while in Epstein (1983) it is found that v must be positive and u and (1￿e￿v)
should not be proportional. This is because Epstein deals with in￿nitely long
lived agents, which makes it impossible to obtain well-behaved representations
where agents have no time preferences - as is known from Diamond (1965).
The constraints on u and v in Epstein (1983) lead to ruling out the multiplica-
tive model, which is precisely obtained whenever v = 0 or when u and (1 ￿ e￿v)
are proportional. However, the multiplicative speci￿cation becomes possible in
our framework, which accounts for the ￿niteness of human life. Multiplicative
representations of preferences are not new to the economic literature. They were
advocated by several theoretical papers (in particular by Richard, 1975) and used
4The ￿rst appearance of this recursive structure may be attributed to Uzawa (1968) who
suggested a similar speci￿cation in continuous time.
14to deal with very concrete issues (Pye, 1973, Ahn, 1989, van der Ploeg, 1993).
But these multiplicative representations remained unpopular. When they were
used in an in￿nite horizon setting, they were augmented with an exogenous time
discounting factor, and then explicitly disregarded for being non-stationary (see
for example the discussion in Epstein and Zin, 1989, p. 951).
Our results emphasize that multiplicative preferences can be stationary. More-
over, they emerge from the set of stationary preferences as being of particular in-
terest. First, as we will see, the multiplicative model appears to be one of the two
polar cases that combine stationarity and separability, the other being the usual
additive speci￿cation. Secondly, the multiplicative model provides a straightfor-
ward way to separate intertemporal substitution and risk aversion within the sta-
tionary and expected utility framework. By increasing the constant k in the equa-
tion (4) that de￿nes the multiplicative utility function, one increases risk aversion
without changing ordinal preferences. The multiplicative model therefore makes
it possible to analyze the role of risk aversion in intertemporal problems, without
abandoning the expected utility framework or the stationarity assumption.
6 Properties of stationary preferences
The general form of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions that repre-
sent stationary preferences is given in equation (1). However, the meanings of the
functions u and v that appear in this formulation are not obvious. For example,
we know that when v is constant it represents the rate of time preference. But
it is not clear what the rate of time preference is when v is not constant. Simi-
larly, it is not trivial, a priori, to interpret the derivative of v, etc. This section
provides general de￿nitions of two important concepts -time preference and ICA-
and deduces what their expressions turn out to be when the utility function has
the form given in (1). The meanings of u and v will then become clearer. The
additive and multiplicative speci￿cations will then appear as corresponding to
fundamental assumptions.
In order to avoid technical di¢ culties we make two additional assumptions.
15Assumption 1 The functions u and v that appear in equation (1) are twice
continuously di⁄erentiable.
Assumption 2 The functions u and v are such that for any life (zi)i2N and any




Time preference is a familiar notion, usually measured by the rate of time
preference. The rate of time preference at time t is usually de￿ned from the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption at two subsequent periods of
time, when controlling for variation in consumption. More precisely if we take a
life (zi)i2N and time t such that zt 6= d we de￿ne the rate of time preference at
time t by:






The rate of time preference simply describes how marginal utility of consumption
varies along the life cycle when controlling for variations in consumption. With
the utility index provided in (1) simple derivations lead to:
RTPt(z) =







With the additive speci￿cation, RTPt(z) = 1 ￿ ￿, which explains the usual
interpretation of ￿: The multiplicative model provides RTPt(z) = 0; consistent




The notion of intertemporal correlation aversion (ICA) is much less
well-known, although it has occasionally featured in the economic literature, as
mentioned in Section 2. We use the three words ￿intertemporal correlation aver-
sion￿to stress that it corresponds to a particular measure of correlation aversion
that can be de￿ned in the intertemporal framework.
Correlation aversion, which itself is not very well known, is a natural concept
when looking at preferences over several attributes under uncertainty. It has been
16separately introduced, under di⁄erent names, by de Finetti (1952) and Richard
(1975). The terminology ￿correlation aversion￿comes from Epstein and Tanny
(1980). Basically, when considering preferences over bivariate lotteries, correla-
tion aversion tells whether an individual prefers lotteries that exhibit a positive
or a negative correlation. Formally, preferences over bivariate lotteries exhibit a
positive correlation aversion if and only if, for all x1; x2; y1; y2; such that x1 < x2
















One can de￿ne a simple index of correlation aversion with respect to consumption







for all life such that zt+1 6= d: This index is positive (resp. negative) if individuals
prefer consumption lotteries at times t and t+1 to be negatively (resp. positively)
correlated. Moreover, working along the same lines as Bommier (2007), one could
relate this index of correlation to the amount of consumption that is necessary
to compensate for a positive and in￿nitesimally small correlation.5
The expression that relates ICA to the functions u and v is very simple:
￿t(z) = v
0(zt) (8)
ICA is then equal to zero with the additive speci￿cation, and positive when we
consider increasing functions v.
ICA proves to be an important characteristic of individual preferences in a












Thus the formula of the correlation premium should be modi￿ed accordingly. In the limit case
where the length of the time period goes to zero, both de￿nitions coincide.
17number of instances. For example, Bommier (2007) shows that ICA is simply
related to the di⁄erence between local measures of relative risk aversion and
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. It is thus natural to see ICA playing a
major role for determining optimal ￿nancial strategies, as shown in Ahn (1989),
van der Ploeg (1993), for example.
Still, ICA is probably even more important when accounting for the risk of
death. The point is that death is an irreversible event. Thus in the case of death
at age t, the individual states at ages greater than t are all set to the ￿death￿
state. A bad outcome (zt = d) in period t is thus necessarily combined with
a bad outcome in period ￿ > t. Since ICA re￿ ects the aversion for combining
bad outcomes in a given period with bad outcomes in another period, we expect
ICA to strongly a⁄ect how individuals respond to the risk of death. But, before
getting there, we explain how the notion of time preferences and ICA lead to
draw a natural partition of the set of stationary preferences.
7 A typology of stationary lifetime preferences
Let us ￿rst express very simple facts that summarize in formal terms what appears
from the analytic expressions that were given in the previous section. Some of
these facts are well known and are discussed in Keeney and Rai⁄a (1973) or in
Wakker, Jansen and Stiggelbout (2004). Others are fairly obvious. They are
formally stated in Results 1 and 2, below, which aim at explaining how simple
considerations about time preferences and ICA lead to delimit particular subsets
within the set of stationary preferences.
Result 1 The following statements are equivalent:
1. Preferences are additive or multiplicative.
2. Preferences are weakly separable.6
3. The rate of time preference is independent of the consumption pro￿le, age
and the length of life.
6Weak separability means that the marginal rate of substitution between consumptions at
two di⁄erent ages is una⁄ected by consumption at another age.
184. The rate of time preference is constant along any (￿nite) constant consump-
tion path.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Result 2 1. Preferences are additive if and only if intertemporal correlation
aversion always equals zero.
2. Preferences are multiplicative if and only if the rate of time preference al-
ways equals zero.
Proof. The ￿rst statement immediately follows from equation (8). As for
the second statement, we know from (6) that the rate of time preference always
equals zero if and only if u0(ct)(1￿e￿v(ct))￿v0(ct)u(ct)e￿v(ct) = 0. This equivalent
to u0(c)h(c) ￿ u(c)h0(c) = 0 where h is the function given by h(c) = (1 ￿ e￿v(c)):
Under assumption 1, this is the case if and only if u and h are proportional,
which, by de￿nition, means that preferences are multiplicative.
A simple picture of the set of stationary preferences follows from these three
propositions (see Figure 1).
Result 2 emphasizes that stationary preferences can be represented by a mul-
tiplicative utility function if and only if individuals have no pure time preferences.
This may seem an unpleasant feature of the multiplicative model, in contradiction
with empirical ￿ndings indicating that individuals prefer present consumption
over future consumption. However, as was ￿rst emphasized in Bommier (2006),
the combination of ICA and uncertainty can generate sizable time discounting.
In particular, when lifetime is random, the model with zero time preferences but
positive ICA can generate discount rates that are comparable in size with what it
is usually assumed in the economic literature. This result was obtained by focus-
ing on weakly separable speci￿cations, and assuming an in￿nite value of life. We
extend below the analysis to any stationary preferences, including those who com-
bine pure time preferences and ICA, in order to obtain a general decomposition
of the rate of time discounting.
198 Discount rate and intertemporal correlation
aversion with mortality risk
In problems like that of life cycle consumption planning of human beings, there
is ex-ante always considerable uncertainty about the length of life. Therefore, the
concepts that are de￿ned for a given length of life (such as those discussed in Sec-
tion 6) cannot be directly observed. Typically, what can be observed are marginal
concepts that describe individual preferences in a neighborhood of non-degenerate
lotteries on the length of life. For example, we do not observe individuals￿rate
of time preference, but how individuals discount consumption knowing that the
length of life is uncertain. Also, we do not observe the marginal rate of sub-
stitution between length of life and consumption, but the willingness to pay for
reducing the hazard risk of death at a given moment in time. The aim of this
section is to make explicit the link between time preferences, ICA and what can
be inferred from the behavior of agents with an uncertain lifetime.
In the following, a mortality pattern, that we will denote by the letter ￿, will
be a sequence of age speci￿c mortality rates ￿ = (￿t)t2N. For all t ￿ 0; ￿t 2 [0;1]
is the probability of dying at the end of period t, conditional on being alive at
the beginning of period t. It will be assumed that for all mortality patterns
considered there exists some ￿nite time ￿ such that ￿￿ = 1. To any pro￿le of
mortality rates corresponds a distribution of the age at death ￿t and a survival
pro￿le st. The number ￿t gives the probability that the agent dies at the end of





The number st gives the probability that an individual will be alive during period





Because we assume that there is always some ￿nite time ￿ such that ￿￿ = 1 the
20sequences st and ￿t will be equal to zero after a ￿nite time. In practice, this
guarantees that all the in￿nite sums we consider below are well de￿ned. Note
that we have the simple relations:






In the case where agents face an uncertain lifetime, they make choices that
will generate di⁄erent "lives" (i.e. di⁄erent elements of Z) depending on when
they die. For example, they may have to choose a consumption pro￿le c 2 RN
+
which, in case of death at age T; will generate a life z 2 Z given by:
zi = ci for all i ￿ T and zi = d for all i > T
For practicality we will denote such a life by (c;T).
For any real function f(x;T) that depends on some attributes, x; and on the








E￿;tf(x;.) is simply the average of f(x;T) when T follows the distribution of the
age at death truncated at T ￿ t. For example, in the case where f(x;T) is the
age at death (that is when f(x;T) = T), then E￿;tf(x;.) is the average age at
death of the individuals that were alive at the beginning of period t:
Combining (9), (10) and (11), one readily obtains:





[f(x;i) ￿ f(x;i ￿ 1)] (12)
so that the ￿;t￿average of f(x;T) can be expressed as a function of the survival
probabilities, instead of a function of the distribution of the age at death.
Life cycle planning involves choosing a consumption path c 2 RN
+, knowing









When T is random, individuals aim at maximizing the expected utility, given the





Using (12), this can be rewritten as:
E￿;0U(c;:) = u(c0) +
+1 X
i=1








We recognize here a generalization -in discrete time- of the lifetime utility function
suggested by Yaari (1965), which is obtained when v is constant.
Local properties of individual preferences in the neighborhood of elements of
L(Z) characterized by a given consumption pro￿le and a non-degenerate mortality
pattern can then be de￿ned. For any mortality pattern and any consumption
pro￿le, we de￿ne the ￿￿rate of discount at time t by:













and the value of a statistical life at age t by:






22Equations (15) and (16) extend the de￿nitions given by (5) and (7) to the case
where the length of life is not known with certainty. The value of a statistical life,
V SL￿;t, is nothing other than the opposite of the marginal rate of substitution
between mortality at time t and consumption at time t. The terminology Value
of a Statistical Life is consistent with that used in Johansson (2002).
We can now express the following result:
Proposition 2 For any consumption pro￿le, c, any mortality pattern, ￿, and
any time, t; we have










Proof. See Appendix B.
The ￿rst part of Proposition 2, which is a consequence of the recursive struc-
ture of the expected utility function (14), indicates that the ￿￿ICA age t is simply
equal to the ICA when life duration is certain, and greater than t: Observation of
ICA is therefore not complicated by the presence of mortality. Direct estimations
of ICA can be achieved through simple experiments, as with those developed by
Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rustr￿m (2011). The same statement is not true
however for the rate of time preference.
We can observe from equation (18) that the ￿-rate of discount is the sum of
four terms. The ￿rst one, 1
E￿;t( 1
RTPt ), is the harmonic mean of the rate of time
preference. This term accounts for individuals￿pure time preferences. In the case
of the additive or multiplicative model, the rate of time preference is a constant
and the ￿rst term is simply the exogenous rate of time preference. However, in
the general case, the rate of time preference may depend on the length of life.
Equation (18) indicates that its harmonic mean is what matters when the length
of life is random.
The second term is the mortality rate. It accounts for the fact that mortality
creates a risk on future consumption. Consumption only occurs in case of survival.
The third term stresses the role of ICA. It vanishes when ICA equals zero,
23and consequently has remained unnoticed in the economic literature that relies
on time additive models to account for lifetime uncertainty.
Two parallel lines of argument can be followed to provide intuition about
the origin of this third term. The ￿rst one sticks to the crude meaning of ICA.
Mortality generates a risk on tomorrow￿ s consumption that is positively correlated
to a much greater risk: the risk of losing life for ever. If tomorrow￿ s consumption
proves to be impossible, because of death, so will be the case of consumption at
any date after tomorrow. Agents with positive ICA will react to this correlation
by decreasing the risk on tomorrow￿ s consumption: that is by consuming more
today and less tomorrow. The magnitude of the reaction depends on the mortality
risk, ICA and the value of the other items at risk (life, whose value is given by
V SL￿;t). This explains the structure of this third term.
Another way of thinking about the third term of (18) involves considering the
(ex-post) distribution of lifetime utility. Mortality makes lifetime utility random:
in the standard situation where u(c(t)) remains positive, lifetime utility is low in
case of an early death, and high in case of a late death. However, reallocating
consumption towards early periods of life is a way to make the distribution of
lifetime utility less unequal. By consuming early in the life cycle, one increases
lifetime utility of short lives and lowers the utility gap between short and long
lives. The willingness to reallocate consumption for that purpose depends on
individuals￿ICA. It vanishes when individuals are indi⁄erent to intertemporal
correlation (that is in the additive model) and increases with ICA.
The fourth term in equation (18) is an interaction term between mortality and
pure time preference. This term appears because we work with discrete time, but
would disappear in continuous time. In fact, when the length of the time period
goes to zero, all the ￿rst three terms decrease proportionally to the length of the
time period. For example if mortality rate at some age is x% per year -with x
small- and we shift to monthly periods, we roughly get a mortality rate of x
12%
per month. The same is true with the rate of time discounting. The fourth term,
which is the negative of the product of the mortality rate and the harmonic mean
of the rate of time discounting, would decrease -in absolute value- proportionally
to the square of the length of the time period. Shifting from a yearly time period
24to a monthly one, would lead to divide this term by 144, while the others would
be divided by 12 only. As the length of the time period tends towards zero, this
second-order term becomes negligible; it eventually disappears in the continuous
setting.
If time discounting may be only partially driven by time preferences, the
key question is how, in theory at least, we could identify individuals￿pure time
preferences. Looking at the role of mortality in Proposition 2 provides a solution.
Indeed, from equation (18), if we consider that the length of the time periods are
small enough so that second-order terms can be neglected, we obtain that the rate
of time discounting at age t is a linear function of ￿t, with slope (1 + ￿tV SL￿;t)
and intercept 1
E￿;t( 1
RTPt ).7 In absence of pure time preferences the elasticity of
the ￿￿rate of discount at age t with respect to mortality at age t equals 1.
If individuals have positive pure time preferences then this elasticity is smaller
than one. More generally, a regression of the rate of discount at age t with a
list of variables including the mortality rate at age t could theoretically provide
estimates of both E￿;t( 1
RTPt) and ￿tV SL￿;t. The di¢ culty of the task should
not be underestimated, however, since one needs to control for mortality rates at
ages greater than t; which are strongly correlated with the mortality rate at age t.
Following this direction would thus require us to have simultaneous estimates on
individual rates of discount, on the one hand, and mortality rates at all (present
and future) ages, on the other hand.
Proposition 2 makes it clear that ICA plays a central role when considering
the impact of mortality. In the case where ICA is neglected (or assumed to equal
zero) then equation (18) reduces to RTP￿;t = RTP +￿t(1￿RTP).8 In that case,
mortality does contribute to the rate of time discounting, but, quantitatively
7Interpretation of equation (18) requires to account for the fact V SL￿;t and E￿;t( 1
RTPt) also
depend on mortality at age t: However, as is explained at the end of Appendix B, where the
role of ￿t is made fully explicit, this dependence only generates second order terms that can be
neglected if we assume that the length of the time period is small.
8In the case where agents have zero ICA, preferences are additive and the rate of time
preference is a constant. In the particular case where RTP = 0, then the rate of time discounting
equals the mortality rate. Assuming constant mortality, no exogenous time preference (RTP =
0) and no ICA (￿t = 0) could then be a way to provide suppport for the additive model with
exponential discounting. This was noted in Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995, p. 734),
with no explicit mention of the assumption of intertemporal correlation neutrality, however.
25speaking, when considering human mortality, the contribution is small unless
considering people at old ages or with low life expectancy. Indeed, in a country
like the US, average mortality rates equal 0.1% per year at 40 and do not reach
1% per year before age 62, and are therefore small compared to usual estimates
for the rate of discount. When agents have a positive ICA (that is: ￿t > 0),
there is an another term, ￿t￿tV SL￿;t(c); through which mortality contributes to
time discounting. This term can generate substantial time discounting, even if
mortality and ICA are small, since the value of statistical life is usually estimated
to be very large.9
9 Life cycle consumption
Allowing for non zero ICA signi￿cantly changes the predictions of life cycle models
and provides new insights on a number of topics. As mentioned in Section 2,
applications bearing on the impact of mortality decline on aggregate savings, the
value of life, the design of social security systems and on life-cycle portfolio choices
are developed in other papers. We shall not return to these aspects, but focus on
a simple issue related to consumption smoothing.
There is an on-going debate on the shape of the life cycle consumption pro￿le,
and how this can be rationalized. It is indeed found that the relation between age
and consumption has an inverse U-shape, consumption increasing during the ￿rst
part of the lifecycle and then declining. There is of course some heterogeneity
in the estimates of this consumption pro￿le, and at which age consumption is
peaking, but the inverse U-shape relationship is quite robust. The literature also
agrees that variation in household composition may partly - but not completely-
account for the age variation of consumption. In order to have a plausible ex-
planation, while relying on the standard additive life cycle model, one has to
incorporate numbers of features, including imperfect (or inexistent) annuity mar-
kets and the need for precautionary savings. The particular role of mortality is the
object of Feigenbaum (2008), who explains that, in the absence of annuity mar-
9The priceless life context approximation suggested in Bommier (2006) is a limit case where
ICA tends to zero (preferences being almost linear) and the VSL goes to in￿nity, the product
of the two having a ￿nite limit.
26kets, mortality can indeed generate a hump shape consumption pro￿le, but which
does not match what is documented by empirical papers. Feigenbaum actually
concludes that "mortality is an unlikely answer to the question of consumption
hump" (Feigenbaum, 2008, p. 846).
The object of the current section is to discuss whether departing from the
additive speci￿cation, and opting for a model that allows for ICA, may provide
an explanation for the shape of the consumption pro￿le which was estimated
empirical studies. More precisely, we will investigate whether the additive and
the multiplicative models may generate consumption pro￿les that match the one
estimated by FernÆndez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007).10
In practice we consider the 1990 (male-female average) US mortality rates,11
downloaded from the Human Mortality Database, and look at the optimal con-
sumption pro￿le of agents who have to allocate some exogenous wealth endow-
ment having access to perfect credit and annuity markets. We do not model
labor supply and/or retirement behavior. Though in presence of perfect credit
markets, agents face a single budget constraint (expected lifetime consumption
should not exceed expected lifetime earnings) and are therefore confronted by a
problem which is very similar to the one we consider.






￿tct ￿ ￿0 (19)
where R is the gross return of the risk-free asset. The budget constraint accounts
for survival probabilities since, in absence of bequest motives, agents should invest
all their wealth in annuities, which provide a return R
1￿￿t in case of survival,
10Our choice to use the results of FernÆndez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007) as a reference is
partly due to the fact they provide estimates until old ages, contrary to many other studies
that focus on what happen at younger ages.
11Estimates from FernÆndez-Villaverde and Krueger come from a US data gathered during
the years 1980-2001. This is why why we use 1990 US mortality data.
27exceeding the return of the risk free asset, R.12
We solve this problem for both the additive and multiplicative speci￿cation.



















For both the additive and multiplicative speci￿cations we assume that agents





cw00(c) should be independent of c or, equivalently,
u(c) = u0 +
c1￿￿u
1 ￿ ￿u
and w(c) = w0 +
c1￿￿w
1 ￿ ￿w
for some constants u0; w0;￿u and ￿w. The constants u0 and w0 cannot be normal-
ized to zero, as representations (3) and (4) already assume a speci￿c normalization
for the functions u and w, which must ful￿ll u(d) = w(d) = 0. These constants
u0 and w0 impact the welfare gap between being dead and being alive and con-
suming c. As such they are the main determinants of the value of a statistical






By iteration we get:

















which taking the limit n ! 1 provides
+1 X
t=0
stR￿tct ￿ ￿0 ;
as stated in (19).
28life, for which we have empirical estimates to calibrate our models. However, as
the value of a statistical life also depends on other parameters (and in particular
of ￿ , k;￿u and ￿w), calibrations of the additive and multiplicative models have
to be performed separately leading to di⁄erent values for u0 and w0.
In practice we will choose u0 and w0 so that an individual having a background
mortality provided by the 1990 US life table and income 1 would be indi⁄erent
between facing an extra risk of death of 0.0001 per year, from age 20 till the end
of his/her life, or having an income of 1:035. This is consistent with a (survival
weighted) average value of a statistical life of 7 million dollars (a reasonable value,
according to Viscusi and Aldy, 2003) if we assume that one unit of income actually
corresponds to 20000 dollars per year.
The parameters ￿ , k;￿u and ￿w are chosen to minimize the (survival weighted)
average distance between the predicted consumption pro￿le and the one provided
in ￿gure 4 of FernÆndez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007).
In the case of the additive model it is well known that the solution to the













provide the same solution. There is therefore an indeterminacy when trying to
￿nd the best ￿t with the pro￿le taken from FernÆndez-Villaverde and Krueger
(2007). For simplicity, we shall therefore report the value of the optimal con-
sumption growth rate, denoted g (the one which best ￿ts the data), knowing that
for any ￿u it can be obtained by setting ￿ equal to R(1 + g)￿￿u.
As for the multiplicative model, the optimization problem is complex, the
expected utility function being non linear. No analytic solution can be provided
and the results rely on numerical optimization.
Figure 2 plots the estimates from FernÆndez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007)
as well as the predictions obtained when using the additive and multiplicative
models, assuming R ￿ 1 = 2:5% per year. The additive model which constrains
29consumption to be monotonic is unable to provide a good ￿t or reproduce the
hump-shape pro￿le of consumption. The rate of consumption growth which min-
imizes the average distance with FernÆndez-Villaverde￿ s and Krueger￿ s result is
g = ￿0:25% per year, obtained for example with ￿u = 1 and ￿ ￿ 1 = 2:76%
per year. The multiplicative model provides a much better ￿t, although in order
to match the data quite closely one has to assume a relatively high elasticity of
substitution, 1
￿w, equal to 1.41. We shall note however that there are several stud-
ies including Vissinng-Jorgensen and Attanasio (2003) and Andersen, Harrison,
Lau and Rustr￿m (2011) -both allowing for ICA- that estimate intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in that range. In order to provide some idea of the
our explanation￿ s potential, we also run simulation where we constrain the elas-
ticity of substitution to equal 1. For the multiplicative model, we still ￿nd a
non-monotonic consumption pro￿le, though with a smaller curvature than that
of FernÆndez-Villaverde and Krueger (Figure 3).
Accounting for ICA may thus help to explain the hump-shape of the observed
consumption pro￿le. This should not be taken to mean that ICA and mortality
might be the single explanation for the hump shape of consumption. In fact,
there are some aspects, such as the low level of consumption before age 30, that
models with ICA have di¢ culty in predicting, while they could simply result from
liquidity constraints. The potential role of ICA should not be considered as a sub-
stitute for previous explanations based on market imperfections or precautionary
savings but rather as being complementary.
It is worth emphasizing that preferences being stationary, the only source of
variations in the predicted consumption growth rate shown in Figures 2 and 3 is
the positive relation between age and mortality. This positive relation is what
makes life expectancy shrink as an individual is getting older. In that sense,
the hump shape of consumption obtained with the multiplicative model re￿ ects
a pure life cycle e⁄ect. We shall also note that the additive and multiplicative
models, which are two extensions of the simplest model that assumes both a
zero ICA and a zero rate of time preference, have the same number of degrees
of freedom. Thus, if one turns out to have a better predictive power than the
other, this is not the result of a greater complexity, but simply the consequence
30of di⁄erent underlying assumptions.
10 Conclusion
A general representation of stationary preferences was provided. Some particular
speci￿cations were also underlined as corresponding to additional assumptions
on individual preferences (Figure 1). This naturally suggests several candidates
for lifetime utility function. The simplest choice, and also the most restrictive,
involves assuming that individuals have neither pure time preferences nor ICA.
Two natural and symmetrical extensions then seem possible: one introducing
pure time preferences (which gives the additive model) and another one intro-
ducing ICA (as in the multiplicative model). Pure time preferences and ICA may
eventually be combined, as in the general recursive form.
The literature on intertemporal choice contrasts with the symmetric picture
we drew. While the additive model has been extensively considered, and used as
a basis for extensions that do not lie within the general framework we consider,
the multiplicative model remained unexploited.
There are plenty of historical and technical reasons that could explain why life
cycle theory did not explore the case of multiplicative preferences. In particular,
the multiplicative model is an attractive option only when both the ￿niteness
and the randomness of the length of life are accounted for. Therefore it could
not emerge from studies that considered that the length of life was in￿nite or
known in advance. Moreover, although the multiplicative model is as simple as
the additive one in terms of degrees of freedom, it is mathematically speaking
less tractable. For example, while it is extremely simple to analytically derive the
shape of the optimal consumption in the additive case (with perfect markets), it
is impossible to ￿nd an explicit solution in the multiplicative case. The solution
is closely related to mortality rates and can only be numerically estimated.
Opting for a mathematically convenient theory has an undisputable advan-
tage: it makes economists￿lives easier. But the cost may be high. There are
many aspects of human behavior that are di¢ cult to explain with the additive
model, while they seem rather natural when accounting for ICA. We discussed
31above a fact that was identi￿ed as an ￿empirical puzzle￿ : the hump-shape of life
cycle consumption pro￿les. But there are other issues that seem as important.
We end the paper by reviewing three of them.
The ￿rst one concerns the heterogeneity in discount rates. Women, rich people
and non-whites (in the USA) are usually found to be signi￿cantly less impatient
than men, poor people and whites, the di⁄erence in discount rates exceeding that
in mortality rates. With the additive model, such heterogeneity can only result
from heterogeneity in pure time preferences. Thus, the dominant interpretation is
that heterogeneity in impatience re￿ ects fundamental di⁄erences in taste, whose
origins lie deep in human nature or cultural constructs. Men and women, rich
and poor, whites and non-whites would simply have di⁄erent rationalities. Con-
versely, a life cycle theory that accounts for ICA would explain a great part of
the heterogeneity in discount rates by the heterogeneity in mortality. Women
and men, rich and poor, etc. could allocate resources over time di⁄erently not
because they have di⁄erent preferences, but simply because of their mortality. As
argued in Peart and Levy (2003), these diverging interpretations may be used to
support fundamentally di⁄erent ideologies.
The second issue concerns the e⁄ect of mortality changes. The huge decline
in mortality rates observed over the last two centuries, as well as the dramatic in-
crease of mortality observed in the regions severely touched by the AIDS epidemic,
are about the most signi￿cant events in recent human history. Naturally, several
papers have studied the economic impact of mortality changes.13 But almost all
of them rely on the additive model. Accounting for ICA would radically modify
our view of the e⁄ect of mortality changes and indirectly our understanding of
economic development.
The last issue concerns the amount of resources that should be dedicated
to increase longevity. This is a central question in our society where medical
expenses are rising very rapidly. Again, as discussed in Bommier and Villeneuve
(2010), the dominant approach in the value of life literature involves using the
additive model, while accounting for ICA would signi￿cantly improve the capacity
13See for example Bloom, Canning and Graham (2003), Boucekkine, de la Croix and Licandro
(2003), Cavalcanti Ferreira and Pess￿a (2003) and Becker, Philipson and Soares (2005).
32of the theory to ￿t empirical data and suggest very di⁄erent policy guidance.
ICA is a key element for modelling intertemporal choice under uncertainty.
The reason is that in many cases, agents are facing risks which have durable con-
sequences (such as the risk of death, but also the risk of bankruptcy, etc. ). The
time structure then ends up generating a strong positive correlation between what
may happen at di⁄erent periods of time, so that aversion for correlation appears
to be central for evaluating these risks. The recursive speci￿cation obtained in
Proposition 1 and, in particular, the multiplicative model provide simple ways to
account for ICA.
A Proof of Result 1
Using (3) and (4), it is straightforward to check that 1) 2. Moreover, 1 ) 3
follows from (6). 4 is explicitly weaker than 3 and, therefore, 3 ) 4.
Let us now prove that 2) 1. Denote:
A = fc 2 R+jv





By de￿nition (and because of Assumption 1) preferences are additive if and only
if A = R+ and multiplicative if and only if M = R+. The rate of time preference
at time t is given by:
RTPt =
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6= 0 for all t1 > t (20)
Thus, it is clear that @RTPt
@zt1 = 0 if and only if u0(zt)(1￿e￿v(zt))￿v0(zt)u(zt)e￿v(zt) =
0 or v0(zt) = 0: Therefore:
2 ) A [ M = R+
We now prove that A[M = R+; together with Assumptions 1 and 2, implies
that A = ; (and M = R+) or A = R+:
Denote {A the complement of A: Because of Assumption 1, {A is open. Assume
that {A is not empty and consider c￿ 2 {A: Note Ic the largest open interval that
is included in {A and contains c￿: Since A [ M = R+ we know that {A ￿ M and
Ic ￿ M. Thus, there must exist a constant kI such that (1 ￿ e￿v(c)) = kIu(c) for
all c 2 Ic: This implies that, v0(c)e￿v(zt) = kIu0(c). By continuity (Assumption
1), such a relation must extend to Ic, the closure of Ic: Moreover, the constant
kI is necessarily di⁄erent from zero (by de￿nition of A) and, with Assumption
2, this implies that Ic ￿ {A (otherwise there would exist c 2 R+ such that
v0(c) = u0(c) = 0 which would contradict (20)). But as Ic is the largest open
interval of {A that contains c￿, it is necessarily the case that Ic ￿ Ic. Therefore
Ic = R+ and {A = R+. Thus
(A [ M = R+) ) 1 (21)
It only remains to prove that 4) 1. Lets consider a life composed of constant
34path at a level c, till an age T, after which the agent is dead. From (6) we have
for all t < T:
RTPt =






















Thus RTPt = RTPt+1 if and only if u0(c)(1 ￿ e￿v(c)) ￿ v0(c)u(c)e￿v(c) = 0 or
u(c)v0(c) = 0: In other words 4 ) A [ M [ fcju(c) = 0g = R+ . Note that there
exists at most one point c such that u(c) = 0 (otherwise Assumption 2 would
not be ful￿lled). Since A [ M is closed we have A [ M [ fcju(c) = 0g = R+ )
A [ M = R+. Using (21), we ￿nd that 4) 1.
B Proof of Proposition 2
By derivation of equation (14), we obtain:
@
@ct




























0(ct￿1) = ￿t￿1(c;T) for all T > t ￿ 1
Equation (17) is just a reformulation of this result, with the index t￿1 replaced
by t:































































































































u0(ct)(1 ￿ e￿v(ct)) ￿ v0(ct)u(ct)e￿v(ct)













































￿ 1) = ￿￿t
si
st

















which is nothing else than ￿￿t￿￿;tV SL￿;t.
Substituting
st+1
st by (1 ￿ ￿t) in (26), we get:





= ￿t + (1 ￿ ￿t)









In a deterministic setting where people would die at the end of period T > t,
we know from (6) that:
RTPt(c;T) =
























+ ￿t￿tV SL￿;t (28)
which end proving Proposition 2.
As mentioned in the comments coming after Proposition 2, looking at how
mortality at age t impacts the rate of time discounting at time t may be a way
to identify time preferences and intertemporal correlation aversion. However, in
order to do so, one has to account for the fact that both E￿;t( 1
RTPt(c;:)) and V SL￿;t
depend on ￿t. The object of the lines below, is to explicit this dependence and to
explain that this only generates second order-terms, when the length of the time
period tends towards zero.
From (23) and 1
st = (1 ￿ ￿t) 1




] V SL￿;t + ￿tv0(ct)
(29)
where ] V SL￿;t, de￿ned by,














is independent of ￿t.
Moreover, using (10), (11),
st+1
st = 1 ￿ ￿t and ￿t = ￿t
st one gets:
E￿;tf(x;:) = E￿;t+1f(x;:) + ￿t [f(x;t) ￿ E￿;t+1f(x;:)] (30)
38Combining (28), (29) and (30) we obtain:
RTP￿;t(c) = ￿t+













where all dependence in ￿t is now made explicit (in the above expression, the
terms E￿;t+1( 1
RTPt(c;:)), RTPt(c;t) and ] V SL￿;t are independent from ￿t).
The expression shown in (31) seems complex. However, it simpli￿es when
considering the case where the length of the time period is small. Indeed, when
the length of the time period tends towards zero, the mortality rate as well as the
rate of time discounting decrease proportionally to the length of the time period
and many second-order terms, decreasing as the square of the length of the time






+ ￿t(1 + ￿t] V SL￿;t)
where E￿;t+1( 1




RTPt(c;:)) ￿ E￿;t( 1
RTPt(c;:))
￿
and ￿t(] V SL￿;t ￿ V SL￿;t) are also





+ ￿t(1 + ￿tV SL￿;t)
This approximation is exact for the additive model, or when assuming in￿nitesi-
mally small periods of time.
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Figure 1: The set of stationary preferences 
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Figure 2: Life−Cycle Consumption Profile (Best Fit)
Empirical Estimates from Fernandez−Villaverde and Krueger (2007)
Theoretical Predictions: Multiplicative Model































Figure 3: Life−Cycle Consumption Profile (imposing IES=1)
Empirical Estimates from Fernandez−Villaverde and Krueger (2007)
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